Co-owners fighting a partition sometimes cite Pine v. Tiedt (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 733 for the idea that a court can refuse partition when a sale would be unfair. The case says no such thing, and the argument is without merit. Pine was an implied waiver case about investors in a sanitarium, decided by the Court of Appeal in Los Angeles 11 years before the Legislature enacted the current partition statutes in 1976. Today, Code of Civil Procedure section 872.710 provides that partition “shall be as of right unless barred by a valid waiver.”
The sentence defendants rely on, that the right to partition is subject to waiver “when an inequity would result,” has been superseded by statute. It does not represent the current state of California law, which gives co-owners an absolute right to partition unless a valid waiver bars it.
Why Pine v. Tiedt Matters
- It is a waiver case, not a fairness case. The court held that the plaintiff had impliedly agreed not to partition, based on the investment plan and the lease he signed.
- The facts were far from an ordinary co-ownership. Investors bought land for a sanitarium, leased it for 50 years to an operating company, and took deeds that waived partition.
- It predates the 1976 Partition Law. CCP 872.710’s right to partition makes partition a matter of right unless a valid waiver bars it, with no test for inequity.
- Using it to argue a sale is unfair is without merit. Without an agreement like the one in Pine, the case gives a co-owner resisting partition nothing to stand on.
The Facts: A Sanitarium Built by an Investor Group
In 1952, A. A. Guilliaum, who owned and ran Los Alamitos Sanitarium, invited friends and relatives to invest in land for a new convalescent home and sanitarium. He hired James Pine, a general contractor, to build it. Pine’s bookkeeper, Virginia Tiedt, and her husband invested too, and by 1958 they owned an undivided 8/100 interest in the land.
At a meeting in early 1953, Guilliaum explained the plan: the investors would own the land and lease it for 50 years to an operating company, Lincoln Park Retreat, Inc., and would have an income from that lease for 50 years. Pine attended as the contractor, but he soon became an investor himself, taking a 25 percent interest in the land as credit for his construction profits and contributing $100,000 toward the buildings.
Title was first taken by Pine and Guilliaum’s agent, Mrs. Burson. They signed the 50-year lease and then deeded 56/100 of the land to the investors. That deed included a clause in which the investors waived “any and all rights otherwise conferred by law to partition.” Pine and Burson added it on the advice of counsel, to protect their own investment “from those holding only nominal interest.” (Pine, at p. 735.)
Over the next years, Pine took control. At his urging, the lease was revised to lower the rent and shorten the term. By trial, entities Pine controlled held 92/100 of the land, and the Tiedts held the other 8/100. Pine sued them for partition, and the trial court entered an interlocutory decree in partition.
How the Court of Appeal Decided the Case
The Tiedts did not deny that their own deed waived partition. They argued that Pine had impliedly waived it too, by signing the lease and conveying the land to investors who were promised a long-term income. The court agreed, applying “the rule that an agreement to postpone partition may be implied where the purpose for which the property was acquired by the parties would be defeated by partition.” (Pine, at p. 737.)
The court stressed how unusual this co-ownership was. The parties “were invited to become investors in an enterprise,” and the operation of the sanitarium “was part and parcel of that enterprise.” (Pine, at p. 737.) This is where the sentence defendants now quote appears:
“While it has been said that a cotenant is entitled to partition as a matter of absolute right (De Roulet v. Mitchel, 70 Cal. App. 2d 120, 123 [160 P.2d 574]), the courts have held that right to be subject to waiver which may be effected by an implied as well as an express agreement when an inequity would result.”
Pine v. Tiedt (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 733, 738
Read in full, the sentence is about waiver by agreement. It does not say a court may deny partition whenever a sale seems unfair. The court held “as a matter of law that there exists on the part of Pine an implied waiver of any right of partition, at least until the term of existing leases which Pine himself later revised and modified, come to an end.” (Pine, at pp. 739–740.) As it explained, “To permit partition would frustrate the very purpose for which the land was acquired by the investors and for which it is now being used.” (Pine, at p. 740.)
The Result
The judgment was reversed. Pine, who put a partition waiver in the investors’ deed to protect himself from the small owners, was held to have waived partition himself while the leases lasted.
Why Pine v. Tiedt Is Not a Fairness Defense Today
In 1976, the Legislature enacted the current California partition statutes. Under CCP 872.710(b), “partition as to concurrent interests in the property shall be as of right unless barred by a valid waiver.” The Assembly committee comment to the section explains that a valid waiver “is a sufficient defense to the right of partition,” and that the validity of a waiver “is determined by case law.” The statute has no inequity test. A co-owner who has no agreement and simply argues that a sale would be inequitable has no defense, and the argument is without merit.
The cases since Pine read waiver narrowly. Two years later, Heber v. Yaeger held that an agreement about running co-owned property does not waive partition unless it clearly restricts the property to a use that rules partition out. And in 2010, LEG Investments v. Boxler (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 484, 493 stated the rule plainly: “A co-owner of property has an absolute right to partition unless barred by a valid waiver.”
Pine was also relied on in American Medical International, Inc. v. Feller (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 1008 (“AMI”), which denied partition of a Los Angeles hospital and announced a broader “requirement of fairness.” AMI was decided under the same old statute, and the Court of Appeal has since said it does not guide the analysis under section 872.710. Our article on why fairness is not a defense to partition covers both cases.
What Pine v. Tiedt Means for California Co-Owners
- “It would be inequitable” is not a defense. A co-owner has an absolute right to partition unless a valid waiver bars it.
- Waiver takes an agreement. Pine involved a written waiver in the investors’ deed and a 50-year lease to a business. A family home, or a house bought by a couple or by friends, rarely comes with anything like that. See our article on waiver of the right to partition.
- Even then, the waiver was temporary. The court barred partition only until the existing leases ended.
- A waiver can cut both ways. The owner who wrote a waiver into the small investors’ deed ended up barred from partition himself.
Co-Owner Citing an Old Case? Get a Second Opinion
If your co-owner says a decades-old case lets them stop a sale because it would be unfair, have a partition attorney read it before you wait another year. Cases decided before 1976 applied a different statute, and the fairness cases do not state the law today.
Talkov Law can help. With 12 full-time partition attorneys and experience in over 650 partition actions throughout California, our team handles every step, from proving your right to partition through the partition sale and the final distribution of proceeds. Call (877) PARTITION (727-8484) today or contact us online for a free 30-minute consultation.







